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Many supporters of the tax cut enacted this summer viewed it as an important stimulus to
consumer spending. But an analysis of the effects of earlier income tax cuts suggests that the
consumer response to such initiatives is, in fact, quite variable. Two conclusions stand out: First,
consumers will be more likely to boost spending if the change in tax liabilities is permanent.
Second, consumers will wait to increase spending until a tax change affects their take-home pay.
The near-term effect of tax cuts on the economy has gen-
erated considerable interest among policymakers and
economists this year. Much of the discussion has cen-
tered on the question whether tax cuts are an effective
spur to consumer spending. This question was at the
heart of the legislative debate over the Bush Admini-
stration’s tax package, and it continues to stir controversy
as various economic stimulus plans are put forward in the
wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
In this edition of Current Issues, we cast new light
on the debate by reviewing how past tax changes
affected consumer spending. Specifically, we look at
the impact of major federal income tax changes in
1968, 1975, and 1982 and the effect of changes in
Social Security payroll taxes and benefits. Our study
begins with a look at what economic theory predicts
about consumer responses to tax cuts, and throughout
the analysis, we compare actual responses with those
implied by theory.
We find that while almost all of the tax and benefit
changes examined in the study prompted changes in
consumer spending, the magnitude of the responses varied
greatly. In conformity with economic theory, the spending
effect was larger when the tax change was legislated to
have a permanent effect on tax liabilities. Contrary to
theory, however, households adjusted their spending
only after tax changes took effect. This finding chal-
lenges the standard assumption that forward-looking
consumers will alter their spending behavior in anticipation
of an income change.
Life Cycle–Permanent Income Theory of Spending
Most economists believe that consumer spending deci-
sions follow the broad criteria set out in the life cycle
and permanent income theories—two closely related
hypotheses that, in the remainder of this article, are
treated as a single theory.1 This theory holds that con-
sumers wish to maintain a smooth flow, or “growth
path,” of spending over their lifetimes. Thus, consumers
will be reluctant to increase or reduce spending in
response to a change in income unless they believe that
the income change will persist. The shorthand formula-
tion of this idea is that spending responds to changes in
“permanent” income.
Applying this theory to tax changes, we conclude
that consumers will be more likely to alter their spend-
ing behavior if they perceive a tax change to be lasting.
For instance, a reduction in income tax rates or increase
in personal exemptions that is placed permanently in
the tax code should have a larger effect on consumer
spending (per dollar of tax revenue lost) than a tempo-
rary rate reduction or increase in exemptions.
Another component of the theory that bears on tax
changes and spending is the premise that consumers are
forward looking. This premise suggests that consumers
not only distinguish permanent from temporary changes
in taxes, but also anticipate the impact of a tax change on
their incomes even before it takes effect. Thus, consumers
might begin to adjust their spending immediately after a
tax change is passed into law, or even when the outlines of
the change begin to firm up—developments that can
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occur long before the change actually begins to affect tax
payments. Indeed, if consumers do take the long view,
then changes in the legal structure of tax liabilities should
influence their spending decisions more than changes in
the timing of tax payments. After all, one would expect a
shift in the structure of annual liabilities to have a greater
effect on permanent after-tax income than a revision in
withholding schedules or a change in requirements for
quarterly nonwithheld tax payments.
Of course, the life cycle–permanent income theory
cannot be expected to predict accurately every change
in spending associated with a change in taxes. In main-
taining that consumers react differently to permanent
and temporary changes in income taxes, the theory
assumes that all consumers are in a position to spend or
refrain from spending at will—that is, consumers can
defer spending a tax refund because they can meet any
unexpected financial needs by liquidating financial
assets or borrowing at market rates. In fact, however,
many households are unable to borrow on any sort of
favorable terms, and as a consequence, their spending is
closely tied to current cash income. Thus, these house-
holds might be expected to spend a temporary tax cut
just as quickly as a permanent one.2
The liquidity constraints affecting some households
make the application of the life cycle–permanent
income theory to tax changes more complicated.
Nevertheless, we would still expect to see that explicitly
transitory changes would have less of an effect on
spending than permanent changes.
Observing the Impact of Tax Changes
A simple way to observe the impact of tax changes on
spending is to look at the behavior of the personal sav-
ing rate around the time a tax change becomes effective.
Personal saving is defined as after-tax income less
spending. A change in permanent income should not
change the rate of saving out of permanent income.
Assuming that after-tax income prior to a tax change is
roughly equal to permanent income, a tax cut regarded
as permanent will likely have little effect on the mea-
sured saving rate because spending will increase propor-
tionately with after-tax income. By contrast, if the tax
cut is regarded as transitory, the saving rate should rise
at the time of the cut, because after-tax income will
increase but spending will be little changed. The focus
of the observation is on changes in the personal saving
rate, not the level of the rate. At any point in time, the
level of the personal saving rate may give a very dis-
torted picture of household saving out of permanent
income (Peach and Steindel 2000). However, these dis-
tortions are unlikely to change much over very short
periods, at least compared with major changes in federal
tax collections, so changes in the posted saving rate can
give a good idea of changes in consumer behavior.
The analysis becomes more complicated if consumer
spending changes in anticipation of a future tax change.
For instance, if consumers increase spending prior to a
tax cut (permanent or transitory), the saving rate will fall
in advance of the effective date of the cut. By the time of
the effective date, spending may show little or no further
increase, but after-tax income will rise, boosting the sav-
ing rate. If the tax cut is regarded as permanent, the sav-
ing rate after the effective date could be roughly
unchanged from the rate prevailing before the start of
the upward revision in spending, assuming that no other
major events affecting saving have occurred. If the tax
cut is regarded as temporary, the post-cut saving rate
will be higher than the earlier level.
The table summarizes the hypothesized effects of
permanent and temporary tax cuts on the personal sav-
ing rate. The effects of tax increases would, of course, be
the reverse of those shown in the table.
The Spending Effects of Three Income Tax Changes
How do actual consumer responses to income tax
changes compare with those predicted by the life
cycle–permanent income theory? In this section, we
track the effects of major federal income tax changes on
the personal saving rate in recent decades.
Effects of Tax Cuts on the Personal Saving Rate: What Economic Theory Predicts
Permanent Cut Transitory Cut
Anticipated Not Anticipated Anticipated Not Anticipated
Before effective date Saving rate falls No effect Saving rate falls No effect
(but less than in
permanent case)
After effective date Saving rate returns Minimal or Saving rate rises Saving rate rises above
to previous level no effect above previous level previous levelThe 1968 Tax Surcharge
Early in 1968, a 10 percent surcharge on personal and
corporate taxes was signed into law. Initially, the sur-
charge had no expiration date, but its close association
with the financing of the Vietnam War meant that the
public would have regarded it as a temporary war tax. In
1969, the surcharge was reduced to 5 percent and given
an explicit 1971 expiration date.3
Around the time the surcharge was proposed, econo-
mist Robert Eisner (1971) predicted that it would have
limited effect on consumer spending, precisely because
it was so clearly temporary. The behavior of the personal
saving rate after the surcharge took effect in mid-1968
suggests that Eisner was correct (Chart 1). The rate fell
sharply in the second half of the year, a sign that the
surcharge was placing at most a modest restraint on
spending. Indeed, while a one-dollar change in perma-
nent income is generally thought to change spending by
about 70 cents, several studies have indicated that the
effect of the surcharge was perhaps one-half that of a
permanent 10 percent tax increase—in other words, a
drop in spending of roughly 35 cents for each dollar of
revenue the government gained.4
The saving rate decline in the second half of 1968
supports the life cycle–permanent income theory’s pre-
diction that temporary tax changes will prompt few
changes in consumer spending patterns. However, the
fact that the decline did not begin until after the effec-
tive date of the surcharge contradicts the notion, also
implicit in the theory, that households act in anticipa-
tion of tax changes. Although the surcharge was put into
law some months before it began to affect tax payments
and had been widely discussed long before then, house-
holds did not alter their spending behavior in advance.
The 1975 Tax Rebate
In the spring of 1975, a package of temporary changes
in the income tax was enacted with the more-or-less
specific aim of boosting spending.5 The major element
of the package was a “rebate” check of $50 mailed to
every individual income taxpayer in May 1975.6
The second quarter of 1975 saw a remarkable surge in
the personal saving rate concomitant with the receipt of
the rebate checks (Chart 2). The saving rate in the sec-
ond half of 1975 fell back to roughly its first-quarter
level. If consumers were simply waiting a short while to
spend their checks, the saving rate might have fallen
well below its first-quarter level in the third or fourth
quarters. The surge in the saving rate in the second quar-
ter of 1975, and its maintenance at near its first-quarter
level in the second half of the year, suggest that little of
the rebate was spent in 1975 (perhaps as little as one-
quarter7). Consumers appear to have viewed the rebate
as a one-time windfall rather than as an increment to
permanent income and consequently spent little of it at
the time it was received. The rebate was proposed and
enacted rather quickly, so this episode reveals little
about the anticipatory effects of tax changes.
The 1982 Tax Cut
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, signed into
law in August 1981, included three staged permanent
cuts in federal income tax rate structure: a 5 percent cut
effective October 1, 1981; a 10 percent cut effective
July 1, 1982; and a 10 percent cut effective July 1, 1983.
The 5 percent cut of 1981 was accompanied by other
tax changes. Some of these changes could have more
than offset the stimulative impact of the cut on spend-
ing, so it is not clear that the rise in saving in fourth-
quarter 1981 (Chart 3) can tell us anything about the
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May 1975The 1982 cut took place without other tax changes
taking effect. The relative stability of the saving rate
following the July 1 effective date could imply that the
permanent tax cut was seen as an increase in permanent
income and largely spent upon receipt. Nevertheless, the
1982 experience raises some questions about the life
cycle–permanent income theory. First, the saving rate
changed little before July 1982, suggesting that con-
sumers were not anticipating this widely advertised tax
cut, passed into law nearly a year ahead of the event.
Second, examination of the mechanics of the tax cut
suggests that households were responding not to changes
in permanent tax liabilities—as the life cycle–permanent
income theory would predict—but to changes in tax pay-
ment schedules. While the 1982 tax change reduced the
personal income tax rate by 10 percent, the schedules
prepared by the Internal Revenue Service in connection
with the change allowed employers to reduce tax with-
holding by less than 10 percent. If consumers had their
eye on liabilities, the saving rate would have fallen in the
second half of 1982 (since permanent tax liabilities fell
more than tax payments) and then rebounded in the
spring of 1983, as households made smaller than usual
final tax payments. In the event, the saving rate did
decline toward the end of 1982, but then continued to
drop through the first half of 1983.9
Other Tax and Spending Changes
Like the major tax changes just described, changes in
government benefits—and in the payroll taxes used to
fund those benefits—can clarify how consumers respond
to changes in their incomes. In examining the spending
effects of these changes, we draw on a number of existing
studies that consider specifically whether consumers
react to changes in payments received from the govern-
ment (a kind of negative tax), and whether consumers
alter their spending in advance of the changes.
Social Security benefits are a case in point. Increases
in old-age benefits are the practical equivalent of per-
manent tax cuts. Moreover, these increases have always
been announced at least six weeks ahead of time. Thus,
forward-looking beneficiaries might be expected to
boost their spending in advance of the actual increase.
However, research on retail sales provides evidence to
the contrary. While retail sales rise markedly the month
an increase in benefits takes effect, they show little
change before (Wilcox 1989).
Changes in Social Security payroll taxes shed further
light on the anticipatory effects of tax changes. In 1983,
legislators passed a series of rate increases, designed to
be implemented over a span of years. Since these
increases were clearly foreseen, theory would predict
little or no impact on consumer spending at the time the
changes went into effect. Yet a recent study of a sample
of households (Parker 1999) found that spending was in
fact depressed around the times the payroll tax rate
rose. Also contrary to theory is the behavior of high-
wage workers when their earnings for the year exceed
the ceiling for Social Security taxes. This temporary
reprieve from old-age taxes is fully anticipated, since
the wage ceiling is announced in the fall of the preced-
ing year. The Parker study found that in this case too,
workers responded only after the tax change went into
effect—that is, they did not increase their spending
until they passed the wage ceiling.
Research on household responses to income tax
refunds points to a similar conclusion. An income tax
refund is the epitome of a fully anticipated tax cut since
its amount is known in advance of receipt. Theory sug-
gests that forward-looking consumers will not wait for
the arrival of a refund check before increasing spend-
ing. However, a recent study finds that households do
not boost their spending until about the time that
income tax refunds are received (Souleles 1999).
Lessons Drawn from Past Changes
The differing consumer responses to the 1968, 1975,
and 1982 income tax changes indicate that households
do indeed distinguish permanent changes in taxes from
temporary ones. In this sense, households are forward
looking. However, the apparent failure of spending to
change in anticipation of the 1968 and 1982 effective
dates, the failure of consumers to distinguish between
the 1982 change in liabilities and withholding, and the
failure of spending to react to preannounced changes in
Social Security benefits and taxes all suggest that there
are limits to forward-looking behavior. Consumers do
not appear to allow tax or benefit changes to affect
spending until they observe changes in their cash
income, and they seem to gauge the size of a permanent
change in taxes by looking at its immediate effect on
cash income (judging from the 1982 experience).
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July 1, 1982The standard explanation for such departures from
forward-looking behavior centers on liquidity con-
straints (Wilcox 1989). As we noted earlier, the spend-
ing of many consumers is limited to their cash on hand.
Liquidity constraints may help explain the patterns of
response to tax refunds and Social Security benefit
increases, as well as the response to the 1982 tax cut.
However, the sluggish response to the 1975 rebate—
much of which must have gone to liquidity-constrained
households—and the responsiveness of upper-income
households to the annual end of payroll tax payments
suggest that other forces are at work as well.
One possibility is that households may not pay full
attention to upcoming changes in taxes and benefits.
Tax laws change constantly in complex ways, and con-
sumers may lack the time to determine precisely how a
proposed or enacted tax change will affect their individ-
ual finances. Many people may find it more sensible to
put off adjustments to their spending until they see the
effect of a tax change on their take-home pay. In any
event, while the ability of consumers to differentiate
between permanent and temporary income tax changes
is consistent with the standard life cycle–permanent
income theory, consumers’ apparent failure to antici-
pate future changes in taxes suggests that, on this count,
the theory falls short.
Current Tax Changes
A major change in income tax structure was signed into
law in June 2001. The legislation includes phased
reductions in personal income tax rates as well as
increases in personal exemptions and deductions
through 2009. In 2011, the provisions of the law expire.
The personal tax provisions most relevant to 2001
were a 1-percentage-point reduction in marginal tax
rates above 15 percent, effective July 1, and the so-
called rebate—$300 to individuals and $600 to married
couples—mailed to households from July through
September. The rate reduction may be classified as a
modest permanent income tax cut (assuming that con-
sumers ignore or heavily discount the 2011 expiration
date). The rebate is a bit more complex. Strictly speaking,
the checks reflect the partial replacement of the 15 percent
tax bracket by a new 10 percent bracket, a change made
retroactive for all of 2001. The rebate does represent a
reduction in permanent tax liabilities for calendar year
2001; the corresponding reduction in tax withholding
will take effect on January 1, 2002. Thus, from a life
cycle–permanent income point of view, the midyear tax
change combined a sizable permanent cut in tax liabili-
ties (about $40 billion to $50 billion for calendar year
2001, factoring in both the reduction in the top marginal
rates and the introduction of the 10 percent bracket) with
an even larger near-term reduction in tax payments (the
law reduced the annual rate of personal tax payments
more than $150 billion in third-quarter 2001). Because
the tax change had aspects of both a transitory and a per-
manent cut, one could argue that its near-term impact
could have been somewhere between the slight effect of
the one-time 1975 rebate and the apparently large effect
of the permanent 1982 tax cut.
The September 11 terrorist attacks have abruptly
ended the debate about the effects of this tax change.
Substantial changes in the economic and financial land-
scape, together with the ensuing policy moves, have
ruled out any accurate assessment of the stimulus pro-
vided by the rebate checks. Further tax and benefit
changes to encourage household spending are now under
consideration. Past experience suggests that spending
will be greater if households regard these changes as per-
manent. However, experience also indicates that spend-
ing increases are unlikely to occur before the changes in
law and benefits take effect. Thus, a temporary change
implemented in the near term could boost spending, at
least modestly, while a permanent change that does not
take effect for some time would likely have little or no
immediate anticipatory impact on spending.
Conclusion
The last generation has seen a plethora of changes in
personal income taxes, payroll taxes, and Social
Security benefits. Household responses to these events
suggest the following general conclusions:
 Consumer spending will not change until a tax
change affects take-home pay. Consumers
measure the size of a tax change by its imme-
diate effect on tax payments, not its effect on
tax liabilities.10
 Consumer spending will react more strongly to
a permanent than to a temporary tax change.
These observations are broadly, but not completely,
supportive of the view that consumer spending con-
forms to the life cycle–permanent income theory, modi-
fied to recognize the existence of liquidity constraints
on spending (see Campbell and Mankiw [1990] for a
fuller description of this modified model). However, the
failure of scheduled changes in taxes and benefits to
prompt households—even upper-income households—
to spend in advance suggests that we have much more to
learn about consumer responses to policy changes.
Notes
1. The life cycle and permanent income theories were indepen-
dently developed and differ in some details, but are similar enough
that for many purposes they can be considered as one. 
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2. The life cycle theory further asserts that the distribution of a tax
change across age cohorts influences its spending effects.
According to the theory, households save primarily to finance retire-
ment. Thus, retired households should spend more and save less of a
tax cut—permanent or transitory—than working households. 
3. The tax increase was under consideration for many months, and
during this period its connection to the war was made quite clear.
Stein (1996) and Steindel (1973) describe the debate over this tax.
4. Studies of the surcharge include Okun (1971), Springer (1975),
Modigliani and Steindel (1977), and Blinder (1981).
5. The 1973-75 recession is now marked as ending in March 1975,
but the economy continued to operate with wide margins of unused
capacity and high unemployment well after the formal trough.
6. The package also included increases in the standard deduction
and personal exemptions. Originally enacted to apply only to 1975,
these changes were later made permanent by legislation.
7. See Modigliani and Steindel (1977). Blinder (1981) also finds
that the rebate had little effect on spending.
8. Other changes included expanded access to IRAs and a brief
window of opportunity in the fall of 1981 for individuals to pur-
chase tax-free “all-saver” certificates of deposit from depository
institutions. Both of these changes may have encouraged some people
to save more out of current income in order to take advantage of
these tax-privileged investments.
9. Conceivably, the decline in the saving rate toward the end of
1982 is consistent with households’ starting to take into account the
pending 1983 tax reduction. However, other developments, such as
improved economic prospects following the 1981-82 recession,
could have spurred spending and reduced saving at that time.
It is also possible that households were focusing on tax liabilities
in 1982, and that the behavior of the saving rate may have stemmed
from lags in households’ upward adjustment of spending. However, if
households were careful to distinguish liabilities from payments, why
did the spending adjustment begin only after July 1982?
10. We have seen that households in 1982 did not distinguish a
change in tax payments from a change in tax liabilities. Households
behaved in a similar way in March 1992, when a reduction in per-
sonal income tax withholding rates—unaccompanied by a change in
liabilities—boosted disposable income about $15 billion. The fact
that the personal saving rate remained largely unchanged in the wake
of this event suggests that households viewed the change in with-
holding as a permanent tax cut and consequently spent a large por-
tion of the proceeds.